As we mark a decade since the attacks of 11 September 2001, I have been reflecting on what I consider to be among the most poignant lessons learned about the global jihadist trend that gave us al-Qa’ida, and our fight against it. My thoughts, in no particular order:
1. A narrative about grievance, justice, righteousness, self-defense and dominion, coupled with a group of attitudes, values and beliefs (a culture), makes the global jihadi movement the formidable foe that it is. Clusters and clumps like al-Qa’ida ‘Core’, AQAP, etc. that operate in defined geographic areas can be dismantled; core ideologues and jihadi ‘rock stars’ can be taken out. However, the confluence of social and individual precipitants, geopolitical trends and the resonance of collective frames that motivate this movement remains. Osama’s removal was undoubtedly a step in the right direction (not to mention a brilliant synthesis of analytic and operational tradecraft), but I disagree with those who suggest that the jihadi trend has been strategically defeated. We have not dismantled its narrative and culture.
2. A decade of research suggests that the key components of this ‘catalytic’ culture of global jihadi include the following: 1) creating a ‘parity of suffering’ with Islam’s enemies; 2) defending the ummah wherever it is ‘under threat’; 3) understanding martyrdom as both an operational, communal, and personal boon; 4) internalizing one’s obligation to physical jihad to the degree that one supports it logistically or through direct action; 5) believing that the jihadi movement is the apocalyptic ‘saved sect’ (al-ta’ifa al-mansoura) whose constant fighting will usher in the end of time; 6) promoting the notion of ‘brotherhood’ to establish clear identity boundaries between both nominal Muslims (who fail in their obligation to support the mujahideen, or whose actions or statements are believed to take them outside of Islam) and kufaar (unbelievers); and 7) believing that God’s sovereignty has a direct impact on the success or failure of jihadi operations, and that he intervenes miraculously on behalf of the mujahideen when they display the requisite levels of belief (iman). This group culture is “catalytic” because it is constantly reinforced online and framed for movement activists and recruits by sources of perceived social and religious authority.
3. It is demonstrably impossible to reduce the enemy to one activist or operative ‘type’, though many still attempt to do so ten years on. Beyond male Arab jihadists, we have witnessed both black and white Western converts to hard-core Islamism operate in the service of al-Qa’ida—including women—much as we have seen doctors, engineers, taxi drivers and itinerate drug abusers rally to its causes. Again, we fight a story, a global culture and identity, a platform and a method for violent collect action, not to mention a very modern foe (see John Gray’s excellent book) that understands how to compress the space between global events and local circumstances to push its ideas and gain adherents.
4. Belief matters to this foe, and it is in the West’s collective security interests to apprehend this point. Here I do not reference Islam per se; I mean a fundamental conviction that violent actions against enemies so defined by a belief-based worldview—however illogical this extreme rhetoric and behavior appears to the ‘enlightened’, overwhelmingly secular intelligentsia—are perceived to be of calculated, intrinsic and eternal value to hard-core jihadists. Sure, it is trendy to point to examples of lesser-committed individual insurgents willing to dime-out others; those hopped-up on stimulants; or even some who fight for money. However, these are not sparkplugs for this movement; nor are they like those who attacked precisely ten years ago this Sunday. Why does this matter? Because belief—again, not ‘orthodox’ expressions of Sunni Islam, which is exceedingly difficult to define within and without Muslim communities—directly impacts jihadists’ strategies, definitions of victory, and even behavior. Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler’s essential 2006 essay, “The Rationality of Radical Islam” (Political Science Quarterly), speaks to this point, as do Stout, Huckabey, Schindler and Lacey in The Terrorist Perspectives Project (U.S. Naval Institute, 2008), among others.
5. Building more sophisticated sensors, erecting impenetrable borders, and developing ‘smarter’ war-fighting applications will only take us so far against this multidimensional adversary. True, many of these advances are critical to protecting (and projecting) vital security interests, make no mistake; however, I remain concerned that the U.S. and her allies continue to perceive hard science and super-technologies as strategy rather than tactics against an ideas-based foe. No, not everyone thinks this way, especially in fresh-thinking corners of Western special operations communities. However, a tinge of what Christopher Coker so eruditely outlined in Waging War Without Warriors still hangs in the air of Western defense corridors. It is with great difficulty that I shake the analogy of eating soup with chopsticks.
As we mark a decade since the attacks of 11 September 2001, I have been reflecting on what I consider to be among the most poignant lessons learned about the global jihadist trend that gave us al-Qa’ida, and our fight against it. My thoughts, in no particular order:
1. A narrative about grievance, justice, righteousness, self-defense and dominion, coupled with dinstinct attitudes, values and beliefs (a culture), makes the global jihadi movement the formidable foe that it is. Clusters like al-Qa’ida ‘Core’, AQAP, etc. that operate in defined geographic areas can be dismantled; core ideologues and jihadi ‘rock stars’ can be taken out. However, the confluence of social and individual precipitants, geopolitical trends and the resonance of collective frames that motivate this movement remains. Osama’s removal was undoubtedly a step in the right direction (not to mention a brilliant synthesis of analytic and operational tradecraft); however, I disagree with those who suggest that the jihadi trend has been strategically defeated. The persistence of its narrative and culture suggests otherwise.
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Hi Folks,
Our July 2011 Newsletter was released last week. This edition is designed to help our readers make sense of the contours and implications of Anders Behring Breivik’s attacks, which resonate far beyond Norway. In so doing, we have engaged a prominent Scandinavian terrorism subject matter expert and friend of White Mountain Research, Dr. Magnus Ranstorp, in a written dialogue about this game-changing tragedy. Dr. Ranstorp is Director of Research at the Swedish National Defence College’s Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies, the former Director of the University of St Andrews’ Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, and a global authority on terrorist movements and counter-radicalization.
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I just breezed through Paul Cruickshank's July 2011 New America Foundation report, The Militant Pipeline. This is a great follow-up piece to his 2010 analysis of the same name, and should be read in conjunction with two other excellent pieces of work on the subject of Western jihadi foreign fighters by Thomas Hegghammer and a 2010 report, Foreign Fighters: Trends, Trajectories & Conflict Zones, by George Washington University's Frank Cilluffo, WMR's Jeffrey B. Cozzens, and the Swedish National Defence College's Magnus Ranstorp. While Cruickshank discusses the nexus of traveling Western militants and terrorism, not all foreign fighters are necessarily involved with terrorist acts; however, the topics and phenomena are perhaps best discussed in parallel.
Cruickshank's empirical survey of over 30 jihadist plots against Western states demonstrates the critical link between Western jihadist travel and jihadist terror back home. As Cruickshank himself states, "Of the 32 “serious” jihadist terrorist plots against the West between 2004 and 2011, 53 percent had operational or training links to established jihadist groups in Pakistan and just 6 percent to Yemen." Allow me to briefly discuss why this is important.
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I was sent the below opinion piece on jihadism in Libya, which merits a re-print here. The article appears in the 11 July opinion section of the Times (subscription-only, sorry). It's a worthwhile read for several reasons:
- The author, Noman Benotman, is a former senior member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. He maintains an excellent pulse on what's happening in Libya and obviously has great contacts on the ground.
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Rudy Atallah is CEO of White Mountain Research and a transatlantic authority on piracy. I caught up with him to get his perspective on several important issues pertaining to East African piracy. Our brief interview is below.
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I hate to admit it, but I actually like Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) Inspire magazine. Not because its material is actually that novel (as many credible analysts like Hegghammer and Watts have already indicated), or because I don’t want to kick Anwar al-Awlaki’s teeth in, or get into a bar fight with Samir Khan, but because this self-aggrandizing piece of jihadi nerds-gone-wild offers great discussion points for my imaginary Jihadi Culture 101 course.
Why is it worth the time to blog about Inspire? Largely because the publication is aimed at an English speaking audience that includes complete neophytes to jihadi activism. These individuals don’t have a clue as to why they believe what they do, understand what they should do about it, and are typically far-removed from the headier theological and strategic dilemmas that the big-dog theorists grapple with in their (typically Arabic language) publications. Thus, the articles—often mere regurgitations of dogma we’ve heard a thousand times, recycled tracts from Abu Musab al-Suri, or if we’re lucky, the occasional tidbit from jihadi theorist Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi—offer boiler plate sound bites that drive home the essential attitudes, values and beliefs that are foundational to this global movement (at least in its global ‘imagined’ community online). What the magazine lacks strategically—even if the fifth edition is somewhat better, reflecting a deeper connection to the front in Yemen—it makes up for in its simplicity and accessibility (and of course, fancy packaging). This makes for good introductory fodder, and offers rabbit trails aplenty for further discussion. So, sure, it's not exactly on a par with al-Maqdisi's tome, Millat Ibrahim, but throw me a bone, please.
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Dear Friends,
We want to set the record straight concerning a quote attributed to WMR CEO Rudy Atallah that ran in an article published yesterday by the Associated Press (“Spanish hostages freed by al-Qaida-linked group”). According to the article, Rudy said, “It's against international law for Western governments to pay ransoms to terrorists.” He was misquoted. What Rudy said to the reporter was that giving in to the financial demands of terrorists holding hostages was internationally recognized as bad policy—and certainly against US policy—and that Western governments opened themselves to criticism when they did so.
While we should all be very pleased to see the Spanish hostages reunited with their loved ones, we have to recognize that paying ransoms is a major source of funding for terrorists and insurgents globally.
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Folks,
I wanted to draw your attention to the National Geographic Channel’s production, “The Hunt for Somali Pirates.” The show aired last night and featured White Mountain CEO Rudy Atallah, among other experts. You can see a trailer on our homepage and can watch it in its entirety again next Monday, August 30th. Rudy, in his capacity as Africa Counterterrorism Director in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, played a key behind-the-scenes role in the operation that freed Capt. Richard Phillips of the Maersk Alabama.
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Welcome to White Mountain Research’s (WMR) blog, The Summit!
I am Yeti, a WMR partner who has researched and analyzed jihadi* activism for well over a decade. My professional life has centered on understanding and conveying how these often highly motivated and generally rationale (not to mention evil) individuals think and operate in various contexts. I publish occasionally in academic and professional journals, when time and opportunity permit, and am pleased to bend anyone’s ear about terrorism that wanders into range.
What is The Summit all about? The Summit exists to facilitate respectful, unconstrained yet rigorous debate and discussion about matters of terrorism, political violence, and homeland and international security to benefit WMR’s clients, and more generally, the global counter-terrorism community. The discussion can and will range from the shifting ideologies of militant far-right factions in the U.S. to the strategic evolution of global conflict and its implications for governments and corporations. The Summit is geared towards national and international security professionals, and for all who are interested in informed debate about these critical issues. All questions are valid besides those of an obviously inappropriate nature. Rigor, objectivity, creative approaches, critical thought, and important research findings are always welcome here; dogmatic rants, partisan diatribes, racism, etc., are not. (Note: this does not preclude humor or informality!) Although the blog is hosted by WMR, please remember that the views expressed here are “ours”—my fellow mujahid bloggers’ and mine—and do not necessarily represent the opinions of WMR or its clients and partners.
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